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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STYLE CRETE, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Complaints in condemnation were filed by the State 
Road Commission in late 1965 and early 1966 to acquire the 
property of Style Crete, Inc. (hereafter referred to as 
"Style-Crete") for the relocation of the main line track of 
the Western Pacific Railroad and for the construction of a 
new highway known as 2300 West Street in Salt Lake City. 
Both acquisitions were incident to the development of the 
Interstate Highway System in westerly Salt Lake City. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The law issues as to the right of condemnation, public 
use and necessity, and other jurisdictional prerequisites 
were admitted in the Commission's favor. The cases were 
Case No. 
10902 
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thereafter consolidated for joint trial on the questions of 
just compensation (R. 13, 121-122). A special jury venire 
was impaneled and the hearing on value and damages com-
menced on March 13, 1967. After 8 days of trial, the jury 
returned into open court special interrogatories which found 
the difference between the value of the total property before 
condemnation and the value of the remaining property after 
condemnation in the sum of $122,500.00. Judgment on the 
interrogatories was thereafter entered by the trial Court 
(R. 91-94). 
The Commission's Motion for a New Trial was denied 
on April 27, 1967 (R. 95, 99-100). 
MAP OF SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TAKING 
Attached as Appendix 1 herein is a reproduction of 
trial Exhibit D-1 illustrative of the Style-Crete property 
on the base sheet, the expansion plans of Style-Crete on 
overlay # 1 , and the course and alignment of the two con-
demnation takings on overlay # 2 . The Western Pacific 
acquisition is shown as it cuts through the property in an 
east-west direction directly in front of the industrial plant, 
and the 2300 West acquisition as it courses the property 
east of the plant, south to north. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While some parts of Appellant's Statement of Facts 
recount accurately the events of trial, in the main it does 
not. Appellant's Statement (pp. 2-12 of its Brief) is sub-
stantially misleading, inaccurate in context and violative 
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of several long-established principles — it offends the rule 
that the facts shall be presented in a light which most fav-
orably support the findings and verdict of the jury, it fails 
to set out the substantial evidence of both parties and the 
admissions made by the State's value witness, and the State-
ment is argumentative rather than factual in nature. In-
deed, the Statement on pages 8, 10-12 of the State's Brief 
partakes of jury argument on the weight of the testimony. 
As a result, Respondent will herein make its own statement 
of the facts of trial, bearing in mind the admonition of Rule 
75(p) ,U.R. C.P. 
1, Property Before Condemnation. 
The property was situated in the general industrial 
area between 2200-2400 West on the north side of 5th South 
Street in Salt Lake City (Ex. D-1). Of irregular shape, flat 
in slope and of fair drainage, the property was comprised 
of 14.26 acres. Access and frontage of better than 63 feet 
were afforded directly from 5th South Street (R. 180, 647). 
The property was used for the manufacture of pre-cast 
stone products, all phases of fabrication being carried out 
in a specially designed building locaited at the west front 
secition of the premises (R. 252, Ex. D-1). Comprising 
17,000 square feet and constructed of steel beams and joists, 
reinforced, double load-bearing walls, cement flooring and 
stone walls, the building was built in several phases from 
1958 through 1962 as business conditions warranted, at a 
cost of $110,000.00 (R. 246-254, 359-360, 365-369). Upon 
the advice of McCown E. Hunt, a structural and design en-
gineer, the building was built so that raw materials would 
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pass from front to rear (or south to north) in the manu-
facturing process. The economic and functional utility of 
the building, itself, was dependent upon continuity of the 
south to north process (R. 396-401, 439, 441, 496, 497). 
There being no sewer in the area, sanitation was pro-
vided by a Board of Health approved septic tank and drain 
field within the Style-Crete property, located southeast of 
the manufacturing plant and beneath the customer parking 
area (R. 506-512). 
The critical phase of the manufacturing process occur-
red at the south end of the building in the "casting •section". 
After the aggregate was mixed, transported by crane, and 
poured into specially constructed molds of required size, 
the cast stone underwent controlled vibration to insure uni-
formity and removal of air bubbles (R. 384-395, 444-447). 
After the stone began to set up and cure during the "green 
period," it was imperative that the molds be not thereafter 
subject to uncontrolled or foreign ground movement and 
vibration R. 444-447). The Engineer Hunt, Architect Budd 
and the owner all testified to the exacting specifications for 
cast stone (R. 384-395, 444-447, 475-479). The average 
thickness of cast stone slabs is 2*4 inches (R. 388). The 
required tolerances are 1/16 inch or less for panels 5 feet 
wide and 13 feet long (R. 475-476). Vibration during the 
"green period" could result in warping or cracking. The 
cast stone manufactured by Style-Crete was as large as 56 
feet long, 4 feet Wide 1 foot thick and weighed 20 tons (R. 
255). Hunt and Budd further testified that in addition to 
the close manufacturing tolerances of cast stone, uncon-
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trolled vibrations during the early curing stage or "green 
period" would impair its structural strength. (R. 4-44-447, 
481). 
The front of the property had site prominence and full 
view from 5th South Street, while the conglomerate and 
congested section of "the plant in the rear was removed 
from, public and customer observation (R. 595-598), At 
the date of condemnation, Style-Crete had planned, and se-
cured a building permit to construct the final phase of the 
industrial plant, enlargement of the engineering offices and 
expansion of the entrance and parking facilities (R. 371-
374, D-l Overlay # 1 ) , 
The property had functioned as a fully operable cast 
stone manufacturing plant for several years and the testi-
mony was unequivocal from every witness qualified to 
speak on the subject, both for Style-Crete and the State, 
that the highest and best use of the subject property was 
the use actually made, i.e., a cast stone industrial site (R. 
570-573,710). 
The market value of the land and building' was evalu-
ated by the witnesses for both parties under accepted stand-
ards, cost replacement less depreciation of the building, and 
market comparison on the land (R. 549, 582-594, 710-726). 
For the landowner, B. Lue Rettilyon of Bettilyon Construc-
tion Company testified that the cost to construct the manu-
facturing building new in 1966 was $123,322.00. Applying 
to that sum a factor for estimated depreciation, the land-
owner's appraisal expert, Ray A. Williams, testified that 
the depreciated value of the building was $111,787.00 (R. 
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590). Based on comparable sales, Williams determined the 
market value of the land to be $5,000.00 per acre or $71,-
325.00 for the 14.26 acres. His total appraisal was $183,-
000.00 (R. 590-594, Ex. D-25). C. Francis Solomon, ap-
praiser called by the State, opined that the depreciated 
value of the building before the taking plus the value of 
the land, itself was $184,600.00 (R. 726). The expert testi-
mony of both parties produced little conflict as to the fair 
market value of the total property before condemnation. 
In fact, the appraisal of the State's witness was nearly 
$1500.00 higher than that of Style-Crete's witness, Wil-
liams. 
2. Nature of Condemnation Taking by State. 
The two acquisitions of the State were: 
Railroad taking. The Western Pacific right of way cut 
across the front portion of the Style-Crete property 
east-west, 100 feet in width and on a dirt and rock fill 
of 8 to 9 feet in heighth (R. 189-195, Ex. D-l) . Fully 
fenced on both sides and in front of the Style-Crete 
;:
 building as well, it did not permit access crossing ex-
cept at 2300 West Street (R. 199-201). Normal water 
drainage conduits along the right of way were not pro-
vided (R. 211). The north edge of the right of way 
came within 9 to 10 feet of the Southwest corner of the 
manufacturing building (R. 189), the center of the 
tracks being 80 feet from the casting tables in the 
plant (R. 304-305). The W. P. trainmaster testified 
that the track would be used by 12 trains daily, 5 heavy 
freights in each direction and one passenger train each 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
way (R. 225). The trains would reach speeds of 60 to 
80 miles per hour in the Style-Crete area (R. 228-229), 
(and the freights would average 80 to 100 cars with a 
gross weight of 5,000 tons (R. 226-227). 
: Highway Taking. The 2300 West acquisition was 80 
feet in width and coursed through the property south 
to north (R. 181, 204). On a continuous dirt fill 3 to 
9 feet, its sloped embankments prohibited direct ac-
cess from the remaining Style-Crete property, save at 
a point north of the plant (R. 729). No provisions 
were made by the Highway Department for drainage 
or water collection ditches on either side of the high-
way (R. 207). 
The total acreage taken from the owner was 1.999, .41 
acre for the railroad and 1.58 acres for the highway. 
3. Testimony on Remaining Property After Condemnation. 
It was with respect to the effect of the two partial-
takings upon the highest and best use and the value of the 
remaining property of Style-Crete that the expert testimony 
was at odds. Style-Crete called six witnesses on the subject 
and the Highway Department called 3 witnesses. Regard-
ing best use and value after condemnation, the witnesses 
of Style-Crete variously took stock of the following factors: 
(a) The building was placed in a depressed corner, 
locked in by a nine foot high railroad right of way 11 
feet distant on the south and by a nine fodt high road-
way immediately on the east (R. 194, 378, 670, D-l) . 
The two acquisitions had produced a pincer or scis-
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sors effect on the plant and its remaining use, block-
ing all front entrances and access from 5th South 
Street, removing all employee and customer parking, 
preventing any feasible use of the south and eiast sides 
of the building, and restricting use of the storage yards 
on the east (R. 402-404, 496, 497, 509-602). Hunt tes-
tified that all reasonable access to the office, engineer-
ing room and the display areas for customers had been 
eliminated by the takings, and that the critical aggre-
gate storage area was cut off by the 2300 West fill. The 
architect, Budd, said that customers cannot get to the 
plant without going through the rear end (R. 448-451, 
496-497). 
(b) Vibration. It was the opinion of two engineer-
ing experts and an architect that the probabilities were 
such that the ground vibration caused by the freight 
trains on the W. P. track in front of the remaining 
building would unreasonably jeopardize the structural 
soundness and tolerance requirements of the cast stone 
process in the building. The leading witness, Mr. Leeds, 
gave empirical as well as opinion evidence of vibration 
damage. One of a half dozen qualified engineering 
seismologists in the U. S. (R. 300), Leeds had not only 
measured, but had evaluated the nature, strength, 
source and effect of all types of ground movement, 
trains, freeways, earthquakes, missile firings, etc., 
throughout the world (R. 283-292). He had monitored 
and evaluated the effect of passing railroad trains 
upon concrete structures at various industrial facili-
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ties in the country (R. 293-300). Leeds made actual 
recordings of ground vibration on the old W. P. and 
the existent U. P. lines 80 feet distant from center 
track. By soil analysis, ground geology at the monitor-
ing points were determined to be uniform with soil 
conditions of Style-Crete. Applying the vibration fac-
tor actually measured to the remaining property of 
Style-Crete, Leeds opined that the ground movement 
would "possibly cause damage to the curing concrete 
in the initial stages to a degree that incipient hidden 
damage might be sustained" (R. 301-320). Further-
more, Mr. Leeds was of the judgment that the building 
could not be used for any industrial use requiring pre-
cision work (R. 322-331). 
McCown E. Hunt, having written substantial spec-
ifications for cast stone and having designed several 
cast stone plants (R. 435, 436-444), was of the judg-
ment that the railroad vibration would substantially 
affect the stability of a cast stone product were an 
attempt made to manufacture after condemnation (R. 
445-447). 
Mr. Budd testified of the need for exactness in 
cast stone fabrication and the critical points of setting 
up and curing of the initial concrete molds (R. 474-
476). He, too, had prepared substantial specifications 
for cast stone products on large commercial buildings. 
Whereas the Style-Crete plant had been a competent 
manufacturing facility prior to condemnation, Budd 
was of the judgment that by reason of the vibration 
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and scissor influence of the two takings, the remaining 
building was no longer functional as such. As an ar-
chitect, he would not accept the products of such a 
plant (R. 476-485). 
(c) Water Ponding. After construction of the rail-
road and highway, substantial ponding of water oc-
curred in the pocket created along the railroad and 
highway immediately south and east of the building 
(R. 508-510, 527). Lack of drainage facilities in the 
condemned area kept the water impounded and made 
it impractical to move equipment in the area or to store 
materials (R. 428-430, 451-453). Style-Crete had ex-
perienced no such ponding problems before condemna-
tion (R.432). 
(d) Sanitation. The compacted railroad dike had 
knocked out the septic tank system and drainage field 
of Style-Crete (R. 451-453). The assistant sanitary 
engineer for Salt Lake City, A. R. CardweU, stated 
that in his judgment, a feasible and adequate septic 
tank system for industrial use, could not be relocated 
at other points on the Style-Crete property after con-
demnation due to soil conditions and water table (R. 
506-512, Ex. D-22). The State, on page 12 of its State-
ment of Facts, argues that the testimony of Mr. Card-
well on the loss of the building's sanitation facility, 
was of "doubtful weight.1 
Significantly, the State offered no testimony, whatsoever, at trial to 
meet the evidence of sanitation damage, and the testimony of Cardwell 
stood before the jury and stands before this Court uncontroverted. 
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(e) The combination of the two takings created a 
physical severance of the remainder into three inde-
pendent tracts (Ex. D-l, R. 182-183). The integrity 
of the property was ruptured by the condemnation and 
little relationship remained between the divorced 
pieces. Particularly was this so with respect to the 
small triangle of .53 acre left south of the railroad 
which now only had value for speculation (R. 668). 
(f) Best Use and Value. Because of one or more of 
the foregoing, it was the opinion of all expert wit-
nesses, including Solomon for the State, that the build-
ing and remaining land no longer had as its highest 
use, that of a cast stone manufacturing plant. Hunt 
said that the building should be abandoned as a fabri-
cation site because of the hazards of vibration and the 
proximate position of the plant up against the two tak-
ings (R. 448-451). Leeds concluded that vibration risks 
rendered the building of use only for dead storage (R. 
322). The appraisers, Williams and Solomon, were in 
agreement that the vibration hazards were of sufficient 
consequence to the buyer and seller in the market so 
as to conclude that the property was no longer suited 
for cast stone or any other precision manufacturing 
use (R. 603, 729), but they differed in their judgments 
as to what reasonable use could be made of the build-
ing. On the one hand, Williams thought the building to 
be suited only for industrial storage (R. 668-675). 
Solomon, on the other hand, was of the opinion that 
the building could be used for light industrial and non-
technical manufacturing (R. 827-828). 
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Having admitted that the vibration and close prox-
imity of the railroad and 2300 West could destroy the 
functional utility of the building, Mr. Solomon was 
nevertheless of the judgment that the remaining build-
ing had a market value of $68,750.00 (R. 832). He 
acknowledged that if that building were to be con-
structed new and free from all the damaging effects of 
the railroad and 2300 West, its cost new would be only 
$77,380.00 (R. 834). He did not testify as to any com-
parable properties, sale or rental, in support of his 
$68,750.00 opinion. Mr. Williams determined the fair 
market value of the remaining building was $28,036.36 
(R. 629), and as a basis, elicited several transactions 
involving comparable warehouse properties, sale and 
rental (R. 623-629). 
(g) Abandonment. By reason of the condemnation 
suit, Style-Crete elected to abandon the building 
for further manufacturing and was in the process of 
so doing at the time of trial (R. 450-451). The owner 
testified that the proximity and effect of the railroad 
and highway made it economically impractical and un-
feasible to reorganize or relocate sections of the plant 
within the building (R. 430-431). 
4. Other Available Land Proffer of State. 
At no other time in the trial did Style-Crete introduce 
or offer any testimony running to the claim that by reason 
of the amount and type of acreage under ownership, the 
total property, before condemnation, constituted an eco-
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nomic unit dependent on its size for full value. Nor was it 
any part of Style-Crete's case that any such economic unit 
had been destroyed or damaged by reason of the physical 
loss of the 1.99 acres actually taken and shrinkage of the 
unit. 
Nonetheless, the highway department during its case 
in chief, offered to show that as of December, 1965, there 
was available for sale by Arnold Machinery Company, ten 
acres of property on the immediate west of Style-Crete (R. 
934). The proffer of State counsel, made out of hearing of 
the jury, represented that the Arnold property was land-
locked without access, and that it was bounded "on the 
north by the old Western Pacific right-of-way" (R. 934). 
Appellant has, however, inserted as Appendix — Figure 3 
in its Brief, a plat which would have the Arnold land abut-
ting a city street on the north.2 (See State's Brief p. 43.) 
The Court had previously denied several attempts of the 
State to raise the question during cross-examination of the 
witnesses for Style-Crete. 
The State's proffer was denied by the Court on the 
ground that the availability of other land was not legally 
relevant under the facts of this case (R. 937). The 
State did not offer the sale of the Arnold land as a com-
parable sales transaction, although invited to do so by the 
trial Judge (R. 937). And Mr. Solomon, the State's only 
value witness, did not rely on the availability of neighbor-
2Appendix 3 of Appellant's Brief is imaginary and styled to suit the 
State's intentions herein. Nothing resembling this drawing was ten-
dered by the State to the trial Court. The Respondent moves that it 
be stricken and disregarded. 
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ing lands as a basis for his conclusions on either land value 
or severance damages. 
5. Charge to the Jury and Verdict. 
The trial Court included in its charge to the jury, 
either verbatim or in substance, 14 of the 15 requests for 
for instructions submitted by the State (R. 63-80). By 
answers to special interrogatories the jury found that the 
after value of the Style-Crete properties was $122,500.00 
less than the value before the taking (R. 14). Judgment of 
just compensation was entered thereon on March 28, 1967 
(R. 91-94). The motion for new trial filed by the State 
was denied April 27, 1967 (R. 95-96, 99-100). 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RE-
FUSING TO HEAR EVIDENCE OFFERED BY 
THE STATE AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF 
ADJACENT PROPERTY FOR PURCHASE BY 
THE DEFENDANT STYLE-CRETE. 
No issue is raised on this appeal that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the verdict. The State attempts to 
overthrow the verdict and judgment by particular errors of 
the trial Court, which are without substance. The nub of 
the State's appeal is stated in Points I through III of its 
Brief, that the trial Court erred in refusing the State's 
proffer which purportedly would show that Style-Crete 
could have "purchased as replacement land" ten acres of 
landlocked property from its next door neighbor on the 
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west. No issue of "availability of replacement land" was 
raised by the pleadings or incorporated within the pre-trial 
order (R. 121-123). Nevertheless, the State argues it here 
as a "triable issue" of severance damage. The answer to 
the State's claim lies in an understanding of the facts 
(which Respondent has set out in this Brief at some length) 
and of the nature of severance damages under considera-
tion. Once digested, the facts dictate the application of the 
law and the conclusion that the State's proffer has no rele-
vancy whatsoever to the issues of severance damage in this 
case. 
1. Severance Damage Valuation in Eminent Domain is Gov-
erned By The "Before and After" Rule. 
Art. I Sec. 22 of the State Constitution is declarative 
of the basic right to just compensation in eminent domain. 
The implementing statute, 78-34-10 U. C. A. 1953, provides 
for the measurement and payment of severance damage in 
the partial-condemnation of property: 
" Compensation and damages — How assessed. 
— The court, jury * * * must hear such legal 
evidence * * *, and thereupon must acertain 
and assess: 
<<* * # 
"(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the dam-
ages which will accrue to the portion not sought to 
be condemned by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned and the construction 
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff. * * *" (Italics added.) 
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In ascertaining what severance damage has been sus-
tained, this Court has long held fast to the rule that the 
measuring rod of that damage is the difference in the value 
of the property before and after condemnation. Stockdale 
V. Rio Grande W. R. Co. and Anheuser Busch Brewing As-
soc, 28 Utah 201, 77 Pac. 849 (1904); Telluride Power Co. 
V. Bruneau, 41 Utah 4, 125 Pac. 399 (1912); Weber Basin 
Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 
(1960). In State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 
P. 2d 113 (1948), Justice Pratt, for a unanimous Court, 
wrote of the definition: 
"The difference in the market value of the 
farm before and after condemnation does truly re-
flect that loss [severance damage] as presumably 
the difference will be founded upon the various 
changes incident to the proximity of the highway." 
The Court has recently given further attention to the 
methodology of severance damage in the leading decisions 
of State Road Coram. V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 
76 (1961) and State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 
383 P. 2d 917 (1963). In Peterson, it was said: 
"As to the error assigned in instructing on dam-
ages : notwithstanding the zealous efforts of coun-
sel to torture them, we think they were such that 
the jury understood and applied the correct measure 
of damages: for the land actually taken: the fair 
cash market value on the date of condemnation; and 
for severance damages to the remainder: the dif-
ference between its fair cash market value before 
and, after the taking." (Emphasis added.) 
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And in State Road Comm. V. Hansen, supra, the rule 
remained constant: 
•'The issue of severance damages was also cor-
rectly tried and submitted to the jury under a 
proper instruction that the owner was not limited 
to the value of the land taken, but was entitled to 
'severance damages', that is, the difference in value 
of the remaining tract before and after the taking/' 
Thus, in a cadre of decisions, this Court has firmly im-
planted as the rule of damages in severance valuation, the 
difference between the fair market value of the property 
before condemnation and its fair market value after con-
demnation and the construction of the public work. Nor is 
there anything singular about the holdings of the Utah 
Court on the point. The "before and after rule" of sever-
ance damage valuation has been adopted overwhelmingly 
by the high court of practically every state of the Union. 
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 528 Sec. 14.23, 5th ed.;3 27 
Am. JUT. 2d 60 Em. Bom. 271. 
In determining the diminution in the value of the re-
maining property caused by the partial-acquisition, all fac-
3In applying the "before and after principle" the treatise writers sug-
gest that the more logical and practical method is to determine the 
total just compensation to be paid by the difference between the value 
of the entire property before condemnation and the value of the re-
maining property after condemnation, rather than to determine 
merely severance damage to the remainder by its value before and 
after. 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 547, Sec. 14.23 5th ed.; 1 Orgel 
on Valuation under Eminent Domain 251, Sec. 52 2d ed. 
This criticism appears justified since it is a non-sequitur of sorts 
to evaluate the remaining property before condemnation, when in fact, 
there was no remaining property in existence before condemnation. 
The Utah cases are permissive of the suggested approach, and both 
parties herein proceeded on that basis in their testimony. 
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tors which reasonably tend to depreciate the remainder in 
the eyes of the buyer and seller in the open market may be 
taken into account. Telluride Water Power V. Bruneau, 41 
Utah 4, 125 Pac. 399 (1912); 4 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main 555, Sec. 14.24 5th ed. and cases therein cited. 
2. Exception to General Rule in the event that Severance 
Damage can be corrected by Replacement of Like Property. 
The preeminent rule of the "before and after" of sev-
erance damage has its exception. If the severance damage 
Which is sustained by the remaining property can be cor-
rected through the substitution of similar property to take 
the place of the property condemned, the measure of dam-
ages may be the cost of acquiring the substitution or replace-
ment property rather than the "before and after" formula. 
This qualification of the general rule is interwoven 
within the precept of just compensation as defined in State 
Road Comm. V. Noble,4 "that the owners must be put in as 
good a position money wise as they would have occupied 
had their property not been taken." If the severance dam-
age to the remaining land can be cured by the purchase of 
similar and available land and if the purchase price for 
such land is less than the severance damage otherwise de-
termined under the general rule of the "before and after", 
then the cost of such replacement would be an adequate 
measure of damage, for the landowner is thus put in "as 
good a position money wise" as he would have occupied 
prior to condemnation. 
46 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957). 
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Even as an exception to the "before and after rule", 
the replacement theory of severance damage lacks general 
acceptance.5 This Court has nonetheless recognized the ap-
plication of the doctrine under restricted facts in two cases, 
Provo River Water Users Assn. V. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 
133 P. 2d 777 (1943) and State Road Comm. V. Co-op Se-
curity Corp. of the L. D. S. Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P. 
2d 269 (1952). And in two other decisions, State Road 
Comm. V. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113 (1948) and 
Southern Pacific Co. V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 
693 (1960), the Court refused to apply the replacement 
theory because of its irrelevancy to the facts. It is clear 
from those decisions that the "replacement rule" is atypi-
cal and applied only in the event that the appraisal of sev-
erance damages is premised on the claim that the economic 
unit of the total property has been damaged by reason of 
the physical removal and loss of the actual property con-
demned. If the land shrinkage of the economic unit can be 
cured by the substitution or replacement of property of 
equal production and utility and if such property is avail-
able for sale on the open market, the cost to cure or replace 
the condemned property is the measure of severance dam-
age. That is the full import of the "replacement rule" and 
no more. 
5As the Appellant's Brief will admit, only two other jurisdictions, 
Missouri and Illinois, have recognized the doctrine. The last time the 
Illinois Supreme Court touched on the issue was in 1886, Illinois and 
St. L. Co. v. Switzer, 111 111. 399, 7 N. E. 664. The Missouri Court 
has mentioned it only twice, once in 1847 and again in 1917. Hannibal 
v. Schaubacher, 17 Mo. 582 (1847) and City of St. Louis v. St. Louis 
S. R. Co., 272 Mo. 80 (1917). The leading treatise, Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain, does not make any mention of the rule. 
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Thus in the case of first impression, Provo River 
Water Users Assn. v. Carlson, supra, it was claimed that 
the total dairy farm, although not contiguous, was one eco-
nomic land unit, and that by reason of the condemnation 
for a reservoir of 18.75 acres of wild pasture, the remain-
ing farm one and one-half miles away was all damaged 
uniformly because of the loss to the "dairy farm as a co-
ordinated unit". For the Court, McDonough, J. noted there 
was no claim made that the remainder had been physically 
severed or cut, or left physically inoperable, or damaged 
due to proximity, location and/or use of the reservoir pro-
ject: 
"In this case there was no contention that the 
erection of the reservoir and the relocation of the 
railroad tracks could in any manner injure any of the 
properties of defendant situated in the town of 
Charleston. There was no proof offered to show 
that either the taking of the 18.75 acres for reser-
voir purposes, or the construction of the reservoir, 
could possibly result in any physical impairment of 
the properties [remaining property] in Charleston" 
P. 99 of 103 Utah. 
It was under these facts that this Court declared that 
if the 18.75 acres could be replaced by the purchase of other 
lands, the economic balance and size of the Carlson prop-
erty would be restored and the owners damage would be 
thereupon cured: 
"If he could purchase other pasture land or 
farm land convertible into pasture, within a distance 
from his barns comparable to that of the condemned 
tract, and such other land would provide relatively 
the same kind of forage for the same number of 
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cows or forage of equal ration-value throughout the 
seven months he used the wild pasture tract, it could 
not be contended that his properties in Charleston 
could be impaired or depreciated by taking the pas-
ture. If another tract of equal forage-producing 
value and conveniences could be substituted for the 
tract condemned, whether larger or smaller in area, 
the defendant would be in relatively the same posi-
tion he was in before the construction of the reser-
voir." P. 102 of 103 Utah. 
In the subsequent case of State Road Comm. V. Co-op 
Security Corporation of L. D. S. Church, supra, the issue 
of severance damage was similar to that in Carlson. Before 
condemnation, the total property of the condemnee was 
comprised of two separate parcels used as a "dairy unit" 
of 100 cow capacity. It was contended by the owner that 
due to the removal and loss of the 7.89 acres condemned 
from one parcel, the available property on which feed could 
be raised was reduced "by about ten head with the result 
that the entire project was damaged at least 20%." As in 
Carlson, severance damage was predicated upon the loss to 
the economic unit by shrinkage of the total property size 
and not from factors normally associated with severance 
injury, vis., proximity and location of the public project, 
restriction of access, air; light and view and rendering the 
remainder physically unusable. The Court stated that un-
der such facts, the availability of other land to replace that 
condemned was an issue properly to be raised: 
"If similar land to that taken was available on 
the date the summons was served, which could have 
been substituted for that condemned, it cannot be 
contended that the entire project was depreciated 
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in value because it was made economically unfeasible 
because of lack of pasture land to graze a minimum 
number of dairy cattle. Under such a state of the 
record the opinion of experts as to the amounts the 
project was damaged was wholly immaterial and 
irrelevant. * * * 
"Since the evidence shows that this property 
could have been replaced there was no basis for the 
award of severance damage except as to the two 
small tracts. * * *" P. 140 of 122 Utah. 
Wolfe, C. J. in concurrence, pointed out the limit of the re-
placement rule and the reason it was invoked in the case: 
"I concur. I desire to add, however, that when 
severance damages are sought, as in this case, be-
cause the taking of a part of a farm has upset the 
economic balance of the farm and thus has damaged 
that part of the farm not condemned, there must be 
proof that there are not available comparable lands 
which could be purchased by the condemnee which 
would restore the economic balance of the farm." 
Between the Carlson and Co-op Security decisions, 
State Road Comm. V. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113 
(1948) was decided. There the owners offered to show 
that in a partial-taking of their property, severance dam-
age to a building should be based on the cost of replacement 
or restoring the improvement. This Court rejected the 
proffer in favor of the predominate rule that severance 
damages are determined by the difference in market value 
of the property before and after condemnation: 
"The restoration costs measure of damages is 
appropriate when such restoration costs accurately 
measure the decrease in the market value of the 
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property damaged but not taken. * * * An ef-
fort to measure the effect of its removal simply by 
the cost of removal and its loss as a foundation as 
originally located does not truly reflect the deprecia-
tory effect on the farm. The difference in market 
value of the farm before and after condemnation 
does truly refledt that loss, as presumably the dif-
ference will be founded upon the various changes 
incident to the proximity of the highway'' P. 117 
of 189 P. 2d. 
The most recent case before this Court which raises the 
"replacement rule" is Southern Pacific Co. V. Arthur, 10 
U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960). The landowner's case on 
severance damage therein was hinged upon the depreciation 
in the value of the remaining property due to inadequate 
access, impossibility of use, and physical condition of the 
remainder, all of which was caused by the design, location 
and construction of the railroad project. No claim was 
made for damage from the loss of the condemned acreage 
or from the shrinkage of any economic land unit. The rail-
road contended that the trial court prejudicially erred in 
"submitting the question of severance damages to the jury 
because no competent evidence was produced that other 
similar lands were unavailable". This Court affirmed the 
trial court and held that the question of the availability of 
land to replace the condemned property was quite immater-
ial: 
"Under the above facts, evidence of the unavail-
ability of other lands would be immaterial, because 
the damages to the remaining lands cannot be miti-
gated by obtaining other lands in other places which 
could serve in this unified operation the same pur-
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pose as the lands from which the sand and gravel 
was taken for the use to which the lands were suit-
able" P. 312 of 10 U. 2d. 
Thus, this Court has left little to doubt in these four 
decisions that evidence as to the availability of replacement 
property may be shown in severance damage cases only if: 
(1) The claim of severance damage stems from the 
removal and loss of property actually condemned caus-
ing a land shrinkage in a formerly balanced economic 
land unit; 
(2) That the substituted property will be of the same 
functional use and will cure the severance damage. 
3. The Replacement Rule was Totally Inapplicable in the 
Style-Crete Case. 
The undisputed damage factors make it impossible to 
bring this case anywhere within the reach of the "replace-
ment land" rule of Carlson and Co-op Security. The Style-
Crete industry was in no sense comparable to a dairy farm. 
Style-Crete made no claim that the total land area was an 
economic unit dependent upon productive acreage. And 
Style-Crete did not claim damage due to shrinkage or re-
duction in size of land parcel. The attempt of counsel for 
the State to inject into the case a proffer of "available re-
placement land" was improper for several reasons. Firstly, 
the "available land" was subject to the same defects and 
disadvantages created by the State through condemnation 
and construction of the railroad, as did plague the Style-
Crete property. It was a landlocked parcel with no access. 
Secondly, the claims of severance damage of Style-
Crete stem from the probable vibration of the railroad, the 
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"pincer" effect of the two public projects, inadequate drain-
age, physical and functional disutility of the building, slic-
ing of the property into three separate parcels, proximity of 
the railroad and highway to the building (11 feet from the 
office area) and substantial impairment of access, air, view 
and site prominence. None of these damaged factors could 
in any way have been mitigated or cured by the acquiring 
of other "available ground". Indeed, Style-Crete could have 
purchased the neighboring Arnold Machinery land and each 
and every other piece of industrial land in Salt Lake County 
for that matter, and it could not have cured in the slightest, 
these elements of damage which were occasioned by the 
location, proximity and design of the State acquisitions. 
The severance damage which evolved herein was of a 
category seen in Southern Pacific V. Arthur and State 
Road Comm. v. Ward and accordingly, the general rule of 
the "before and after" was the legal measurement. Had 
Style-Crete claimed that severance damage was caused by 
the removal and loss of the condemned 1.99 acreage and 
the consequent contraction of the remaining property, the 
State's proffer could have some merit since other available 
property would replace the land condemned and thus cure 
the severance damage. But that hypothesis is not of this 
case and it would have been flagrant and prejudicial error 
if the trial court had not rejected the irrelevant offer of 
proof of the State. 
POINT II. 
CASES CITED BY THE STATE ARE UN-
AUTHORITATIVE AND DO NOT SUPPORT 
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ITS CONTENTION THAT ITS PROFFER OF 
AVAILABLE LAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The State's reservoir of case authority, on the admis-
sibility of its proffer of available land to replace that con-
demned, is limited to five decisions. Two of those decisions 
are from intermediate courts and only one could be charac-
terized as a recent view (1943, with the others being de-
cided in 1847, 1886, 1900 and 1917). While they support 
the position of Style-Crete herein rather than that of the 
State, they deserve only limited attention in light of devel-
opment of the Utah decisions. 
In Hannibal Bridge Co. V. Shaubacher, 57 Mo. 582 
(1847), St Louis V. St Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., 196 S. W. 
107 (Mo. 1917), and St Louis V. Paramount Shoe Mfg. 
Co., 168 S. W. 2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943), the cost of pur-
chasing other land was found to fully cure the severance 
damage by restoring the economic unit and placing the 
owner in the same position as before. The rational ex-
pressed in St Louis V. St Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., supra, is 
representative: 
"But in a case where the taking of a part of a 
tract which is devoted to a special use results in 
large depreciation in value for that special use, the 
measure of that depreciation ought to be the sum 
required to be expended in order to rehabilitate the 
property for such use or replace the plant in statu 
quo ante capiendum; provided, of course, that re-
habilitation in such manner be practicable. * * * 
In cases where no available property is owned by 
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him whose land is taken, the price at which other 
lands adjacent equally as valuable intrinsically, as 
convenient, as economical in use, and as accessible, 
and which can be bought, may be shown as measur-
ing the amount of depreciation to which the lands 
damaged but not physically taken, have been sub-
jected" P. 112 of 197 S. W. 
The Missouri cases are irrelevant in this Appeal, since 
the purchase of neighboring land would not return Style-
Crete to the status quo before condemnation. Nor is the 
case of Illinois and St L. R. Co. v. Switzer, et ah, 117 111. 
399 N. E. 664 (1886) germane since the owner there claimed 
the loss of water to a mill site. The acquisition of water 
from other sources would have cured the damage. And 
lastly, in Gulf C. & S. F. R. v. Brugger, 59 S. W. 56 (Tex, 
Civ. 1900), the condemnee urged that the balance of his 
economic unit of timber land had been damaged because of 
the removal or loss of the condemned property. The Texas 
Court held that the economic balance could be restored 
through the substitution of equal replacement property. The 
Bntgger case is of no significance in the disposition of this 
appeal. 
Thus it is that the State has not sited a single decision, 
treatise, or authority which would factually support the 
result of which it asks in this appeal. The insecurity of 
that position is matched by the rather celebrated fact that 
this appeal is the first time since the commencement of In-
terstate Highway acquisitions in 1956, where the State of 
Utah has sought to apply the replacement rule in a non-
agricultural taking and under facts such as the case at bar. 
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POINT III. 
THE STATE'S THEORY ON REPLACEMENT 
RULE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGE, AS SET 
OUT IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 15, IS IMPOSSIBLE OF PRACTICAL 
APPLICATION. 
As previously pointed out, the "replacement rule" has 
no application to the facts of this case where the State con-
demns two trips of land in opposite directions through the 
middle of an industrial operation. It was not entitled to 
an instruction on "replacement land". However, the lack 
of understanding which permeated the State's approach to 
severance damage herein, is demonstrated by its Request 
No. 15 submitted to the trial Court. In part, it provided 
that with respect to determination of severance damage: 
"In order for the defendant to recover such 
severance damages it has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that as of Decem-
ber 28, 1965, the date of service of the summons, no 
comparable land was available to it in the area 
which could be substituted for the land taken or 
severed. If such comparable land was available to 
the defendant, proximity and severance damages 
should total an amount representing the difference 
between (1) the value of the remainder before the 
taking and (2) the value of the remainder plus the 
comparable land after the taking, less the cost of 
the comparable land." 
This requested charge is not only inconsistent with the 
"replacement rule" under the Carlson and Co-op Security 
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decisions (even assuming arguendo, that such rule were 
applicable), but it is inconsistent inter se. To begin with, 
the Request seeks to amalgamate the replacement doctrine 
within the "before and after rule" by providing that sever-
ance damage shall be the difference between the before and 
after values, less the cost of the "comparable land". Such 
flies in the face of the very theory of the rule which the 
State advocates is pertinent. State Road Comm. v. Co-op 
Security holds that if the replacement rule is applicable, 
severance damage in the traditional sense cannot be recov-
ered: 
"Where there is other comparable land avail-
able to the condemnee that would accomplish the 
same use to which the land taken had been put —-, 
severance damages are not available to one refus-
ing to accept such land;" (Emphasis added) P. 180 
of 1 U. 2d. 
Further, the Utah cases provide that if the replace-
ment doctrine is relevant, the cost of acquiring the substi-
tute land is the measure of severance damage. Request No. 
15 of Plaintiff, in directing that the cost of purchase shall 
be deducted from the before and after values of the re-
mainder, charges the property owner with the ex-
pense of acquiring the same. In other words, the owner, 
when faced with a partial-taking of his ground, should pay 
from his own pocket without reimbursement, the purchase 
price necessary to obtain replacement land. Nearly 2 acres 
of Style-Crete land was condemned but the State contends 
that the 10 acres of replacement land should be purchased 
by Style-Crete. If the 1.99 acre were reasonably worth 
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$5,000.00 and the cost of the ten acres had been $30,000.00, 
Instruction No. 15 would require that the $30,000.00 be de-
ducted from the severance damage award. Not even the 
wildest stretch of the replacement rule under Carlson and 
Co-op Security would permit such a grotesque result. It 
offends not only the time honored rules of just compensa-
tion, but due process of law as well. It is not surprising 
that Appellant fails to cite one case in support of Request 
No. 15. 
Requested Instruction 15 would further advise the jury 
that the replacement land should be "substituted for the 
land taken or severed''. Such is inconsistent with the re-
mainder of the instruction with respect to the assessment 
of the value of the remaining property, before and after 
condemnation, since the before and after values, under the 
State's theory of replacement, would be one and the same. 
Request No. 15, which is the net result of the State's 
Appeal, is incongruous, ambiguous and almost incomprehen-
sible. It is impossible of practical application, much the 
less consistent in theory. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CONCEPT OF SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS ERRON-
EOUSLY CONCEIVED. 
The synthesis of Plaintiff's argument on severance 
damages is set out in pages 23 and 39, paragraph 1, of its 
Brief. It is urged therein that with respect to severance 
damage, "the owner is entitled only to an amount repre-
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senting the damage actually done to the land * * * 
and suffered/' And that there is "a substantial distinction 
between compensation for land taken and damages to prop-
erty not taken". Conceivably, Plaintiff contends that there 
must be a physical invasion or eroding-away of the remain-
ing property, and that severance damage is of an inferior 
rank to compensation payable for land taken. 
Such argument, while popular some 200 years ago, has 
long gone by the board, particularly under the Constitution, 
Statutes, and case decisions in Utah. Art. I Sec. 22 in pro-
viding that "private property shall not be taken or damaged 
without just compensation", makes no distinction between 
the quality of recovery for severance damage, vis-a-vis, a 
taking. Neither is 78-34-10, U. C. A. 1953 discriminatory 
in favor of a taking and against severance damage. And 
this Court in a host of decisions, has used the same test for 
severance damage as it has for a taking, i.e., market value. 
State Road Comm. V. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 
(1963): Southern Pacific V. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 
693 (1960); State Road Comm, v. Co-op Security Corp., 
supra; San Pedro A. L. & S. L. R. Co. V. Salt Lake City 
Board of Education, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263 (1909). 
While there may be a contest as to whether a paticu-
lar element of severance damage is compensable, once the 
issue is resolved in favor of compensability, the standard 
of compensation is market value. Weber Basin Conserv. 
Dist., V. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960). 
The State claims that an owner must mitigate his dam-
age in eminent domain. But the replacement theory which 
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the State urges herein would not mitigate Style-Crete's 
severance damages. It does not, because those damages 
could not be cured or mitigated, as a matter of law, by the 
purchase of neighboring land. Adherence to the State's 
theory would only amplify that damage by requiring the 
landowner to purchase ten acres of other property at a cost 
of $30,000.00, which cost Style-Crete would bear. The 
State's entire approach to the severance damage issue is 
groundless. 
POINT V. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY AND FULLY CHARGED THE 
JURY ON THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
Under Point III of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that 
the trial Court erred prejudicially in its charge to the jury 
under Instructions 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20 and 21. The State 
fails to set out the entire instruction in any instance but 
attempts to rely on error relating to capitalization, punctu-
ation and phrases which counsel has severed from the con-
text. No claim of error runs to any genuine issue of sub-
stantive law and in no instance did the State request a dif-
ference charge, other than Instruction No. 15. Further-
more, while the State devotes considerable time to argu-
ment on Nos. 4, 12 and 20, it took no exception to either of 
those instructions at trial, (R. 937-938), so it is foreclosed 
of opportunity to make an initial complaint in this Court. 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 U. 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954). 
Instruction No. 4 (R. 19) : Although no exception was 
taken to No. 4, the State's objection is typical of its failure 
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to recognize in this case the constitutional mandate and 
statutory method for assessment of damages in eminent do-
main. The instruction, (used time and again in the Dis-
tricts of Utah, including Federal actions) charges the jury 
on the fundamental ordinances upon which this case rests, 
the Constitution. The objections of the State, i.e., that No. 
4 is better reserved for a "civic's class since it directs the 
jury's attention away from the issues being tried," disputes 
the law itself as enunciated by this Court in State Road 
Comm. V. Noble, 6 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957) : 
"Just compensation means that the owners 
must be put in as good a position money wise as 
they would have occupied had (thdr property not 
been taken." 
The State's theory runs aground the same view ex-
pressed by the United States Supreme Court in U. S. V. 
Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1942). 
Instruction No. 8 (R. 23) : The State claims that this In-
struction is a commentary of the Court upon the weight 
and effect of the evidence. In no sense is it that. The pur-
pose of the Instruction was twofold; one, it defined clearly 
the factors under the evidence that could be taken into con-
sideration in determining severance damage, and two, it 
presented, without comment, the theory of the landowner 
on severance damage. Both functions are properly the ex-
ercise of the trial Court in Utah. Anderson V. Nixon, 104 
Utah 262, 139 P. 2d 216 (1943); Morrison V. Perry, 104 
Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772 (1943); Beckstrom V. Williams, 3 
U. 2d 210, 282 P. 2d 309 (1955). Charge No. 8 did not sug-
gest, expressly or impliedly, the feelings, of the trial judge, 
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as Instruction No. 1, had already told the jury that the 
court "neither forms, has or expresses any opinion or judg-
ment" as to the issues of fact. Nor did the Instruction di-
rect the jury to consider the factors of severance damage, 
the phrase, "you may take into account" having been used. 
This Court has held that each party to a law suit is entitled 
to have his theory submitted to the jury by an appropriate 
instruction if there is evidence to support it. Webb V. 
Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114 (1942). 
Instruction No. 10 (R. 25) : Charges that the value of the 
remaining property of Style-Cr^te after the condemnation 
acquisition, should be considered as one property although 
in three separate parts. Plaintiff claims that it cannot find 
"any suppoit in the cases for the proposition". If State of 
Utah V. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956) is not 
sufficient support, State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 
P. 2d 630 (1953), State Road Comm. V. Noble, 8 U. 2d 405, 
335 P. 2d 831 (1959) and State Road Comm. V. Hansen, 14 
U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963) should be. They all state 
that the property is to be evaluated in its then existent con-
dition with the te&t being what one buyer would pay to one 
seller, and not what three or more buyers may pay to one 
seller. The test is as applicable to the after value as it is to 
the before value and the decisions have never carved out a 
distinction between the two in the approach to value. The 
State's plea that Instruction No. 10 could result in an owner 
realizing a "profit" on the sale of the remaining property 
is unworthy of comment. The Instruction properly states 
the law of the case. 
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Instruction No. 11 (R. 26), defines a comparable sale, in 
the legal sense, under the decisions of this Court in State 
V. Peek, supra, Southern Pacific V. Arthur, supra, Weber 
Basin Conserv. Dist. V. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862 
(1959) and State Road Comm. V. Peterson, supra. It is an 
instruction originally drafted by the Office of the Attorney 
General in 1959, it has been used by the Road Commission 
and landowners alike in the bulk of condemnation litigation 
in the last eight years, and it is now considered a stock in-
struction by most trial judges in this State. It does not at 
all charge the jury to weigh any particular sale or one sale 
against another. Instead, it defines the rudiments of a com-
parable transaction of which the trial Court has the respon-
sibility. It is of no difference than charging the jury on the 
elements of the "reasonable prudent man" in a negligence 
suit. 
Instruction No. 12 (R. 27) : The single exception of the 
State is to the use of the words "fairly and reasonably" 
in the Instruction. There is no merit to the objection. Hav-
ing taken no exception at all to the Instruction in the trial 
Court, the State may not be heard on the objection for the 
first time on appeal. Patton V. Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P. 
2d 969 (1937). 
Instruction No. 19 (R. 34), of which the State "laments", 
is of stock variety and has been used over again in 
eminent domain trials in this State. It charges that 
an owner may not stand in the way of a Government 
improvement by refusing to sell his property. That is a 
correct statement of the law. Barnes V. Wade, 90 Utah 1, 
58 P. 2d 297 (1936). The statement that the owner is to 
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be paid "justly and fairly" for the condemned property 
needs no citation. The best that State's counsel can do with 
this charge is to say that it was "inflammatory, loaded" 
and contained unnecessary capitalization of words. The 
objection is against this Court's definition of just compen-
sation and is unworthy of belief. Significantly, Plaintiff 
does not refer the Court to a case in point that would jus-
tify a finding of prejudicial error. 
Instruction No. 21 (R. 36) : This Instruction advised the 
jury that its verdict may be within the range of the testi-
mony submitted by the parties as the weight of the evidence 
fairly reflects. State counsel argues that while the charge 
"is not particularly harmful", this Court should neverthe-
less reverse and declare that in an eminent domain case, a 
verdict may exceed or be less than the testimony of the 
parties on land value and damages, all dependent upon the 
whims of the jury. Such contention ignores the rule of this 
Court announced in Weber Basin Conserv. Dist. V. Moore, 
2 U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954), Weber Basin Conserv. 
Dist. V. Skeen, 8 U. 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958) and Porcu-
pine Reservoir Co. V. Keller Corp., 15 U. 2d 318, 392 P. 2d 
620 (1964). In Skeen, the Court remitted a jury verdict on 
severance damages which exceeded the expert testimony of 
the landowner. Under the theory of State's counsel herein, 
the Skeen case was decided improperly by this Court. In-
struction No. 21 accurately presents the rule of the case. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN 
EXCLUDING THE WRITTEN APPRAISAL RE-
PORT OF THE STATE'S VALUE WITNESS, 
SOLOMON. 
The claim of the State in Point IV of its Brief, page 
37, that the trial Court erroneously excluded an offer of the 
written appraisal report of the State value witness, Mr. 
Solomon, is ludicrous. It is elementary trial practice in this 
jurisdiction that a written report of an appraisal witness 
is not evidence of the facts in issue and while the report 
may be referred to by the witness to refresh his miemiory, 
it may not be admitted in evidence. Such is the general evi-
dentiary rule, U. S. V. Rappy, 157 F. 2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946) ; 
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 129 Sec. 18.1(1). The State 
suggests that because counsel for Style-Crete on cross ex-
amination, requested to see the notes of the State appraiser 
and thereafter proceeded with cross examination as to the 
witness' opinion given on direct, that the door is thus op-
ened for the admissibility of an entire written appraisal re-
port on redirect examination. If that were the rule, it 
would be difficult if not impossible to conduct a cross ex-
amination of an appraiser without having his written re-
port (prepared outside of the courtroom and containing all 
sorts of inadmissible statements and conclusions) received 
in evidence on redirect. 
State's counsel on redirect examination of Mr. Solo-
mon, offered his entire appraisal report as Exhibit P-33, 
although cross examination had only touched upon a frac-
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tion of its contents. The objection was made that the report 
was not the best evidence of the witness' opinion, that the 
proffer constituted an emphasis of a particular part of the 
witness' testimony, that the State had already submitted a 
large written sheet showing the computations and value 
conclusions of the witness and that Defendant's counsel had 
not, by requesting to see the notes of the witness on cross 
examination, placed in issue the evidential significance of 
the notes (R. 845-846). The objection was properly sus-
tained by the trial judge. 
POINT VII. 
THE POSITION OF THE STATE ON APPEAL 
AND AT TRIAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH ITS 
OWN TESTIMONY BY WHICH IT IS BOUND. 
The State has not challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the verdict. The verdict and judgment 
are substantially supported by the predominate weight of 
the evidence. In fact, much of the State's testimony cor-
roborated that of Style-Crete. 
Part of the State's difficulty at trial lay in its misin-
terpretation of Style-Crete's proof of damages. With re-
spect to the vibration testimony, for example, Style-Crete 
introduced evidence as to the probable effects upon the 
building from the vibration of high speed trains. The pur-
pose of that evidence was not to show the existence of 
actual vibration in connection with a business loss, but to 
show an important condition probably resulting from con-
demnation which would affect the thinking of the buyer and 
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seller as to the market value of the remaining property. 
Yet from the approach of the State to Style-Crete's vibra-
tion testimony and, indeed from the Commission's own evi-
dence, it is apparent that the State thought it was trying a 
damage vibration case against a railroad and that the tria-
ble issue was whether there was, in fact, actual and sus-
tained vibration damage. The State's approach overlooked 
the fact that market value and not vibration was the ulti-
mate and triable issue. 
Further, Mr. Solomon, the State's only value witness, 
stated unequivocally that the remaining property and build-
ing would be depreciated in value due to the (a) location of 
the nine foot railroad and highway fill in front and along 
side of the building, (b) the trapping of normal run off 
water by the fill, (c) taking of the septic tank drainage 
field, (d) loss of parking space, (e) loss of visibility, (f) 
impairment of access and (g) loss of special features of the 
plant itself (R. 726-729). He further testified that in his 
opinion, the vibration from the railroad would likely have a 
detrimental effect on the value of the remaining property so 
that it could no longer be used for cast stone or close toler-
ance manufacturing. The State thereafter, attempted to im-
peach Mr. Solomon's testimony through the use of two 
other witnesses, Messrs. Pickett and Wilde. Pickett had 
experience only in massive concrete structures such as 
bridges, and none in cast stone (R. 863-864). Wilde ad-
mitted that after cast stone once has set up, vibration there-
after would weaken the product (R. 855). 
In closing argument to the jury, counsel for the State 
argued in substance that : 
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"Mr. Solomon did a conscientious job and he 
tried to be very fair to the defendant, but in view 
of the fact that he based his opinion of after value 
on some assumptions as to vibrations which are not 
correct, even his appraisal of the value of the prop-
erty after the taking was too low. I believe you 
would be justified in disregarding his erroneous 
assumptions which were favorable to the defendant 
and find that the value of the property after the 
taking was considerably greater than what he con-
sidered it to be, and that the damages suffered by 
the defendant were substantially less than the fig-
ure stated in the opinion given by Mr. Solomon." 
(R. 920-923).6 
It seems rather ironic that the State would call as its 
only expert on value, a witness who followed the State's in-
structions to appraise the property under the "before and 
after rule" only to have State's counsel impeach and dis-
credit his testimony on closing argument. Certainly it is 
inconsistent with what this Court said in Weber Basin Con* 
serv. Dist. V. Skeen, 8 U. 2d 79, 328 P. 2d 730 (1958) : 
"A party cannot call a witness to testify and 
then select only that testimony favorable to his 
cause, ignoring that which is unfavorable." 
The verdict and judgment stand fully supported by 
the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
While the facts in this case presented serious issues of 
substantial dispute, the questions of law were relatively un-
6At the hearing on the State's motion for new trial, the undisputed 
affidavit set forth above was stricken, but the affidavit should be con-
sidered in weighing the merits of the State's Appeal herein. 
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complicated for an eminent domain suit, until the State 
raised the replcement land theory of severance damage. 
There is no room for that theory under the facts of this 
case and to hold otherwise, would be to upset the precedent 
developed in this jurisdiction of the last thirty years or 
more. The ruling of the trial Court rejecting the replace-
ment theory of severance damage should be upheld by this 
Court. The general rule of the before and after is the only 
principle which fits the facts of this case. 
The objections of the State to the trial Court's charge 
to the jury are unwarranted and contrary to the decisions 
of this Court. The trial Court gave all of the State's Re-
quests for instructions except No. 15 on the irrelevant 
theory of ''replacement land". 
A just and fair verdict was returned after eight days 
of trial fully supported by the evidence. The judgment of 
just compensation entered on the verdict should be af-
firmed and the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial should 
be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
PAUL E. REIMANN, 
500 Kennecott Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Style Crete, Inc. 
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EAST 607.20' 
EXHIBIT NO. D I 
CASE NO. 162592 
PROPERTY OF STYLE-CRETE INC. 
II.CD PROPERTY AS OF CONDEMNATION DATE 14.263 AC. 
I 2. OVERLAY I- RAILROAD "TAKING" 
HIGHWAY "TAKING". . 1.999 AC. 
13.OVERLAY 2 - PLANT EXPANSION 
|4. REMAINING PROPERTY OF STYLE CRETE 12.264 AC. 
SO. WEST OF "TAKING" " A " 0.530 AC. 
NO. WEST OF "TAKING" " B " 3.472 AC. 
EAST OF "TAKING" " C H 8.262 AC. 
W.421 5TH SOUTH ST. 
k 
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